This paper analyses the relationship between different equity rules and the incentives to sign and ratify a climate agreement. A widespread conjecture suggests that a more equitable ex-ante distribution of the burden of reducing emissions would provide the right incentives for more countries -particularly big emitters -to accept an emission reduction scheme defined within an international climate agreement. This paper shows that this conjecture is only partly supported by the empirical evidence that can be derived from the Kyoto Protocol. Even though more equitable burden sharing rules provide better incentives to sign and ratify a climate agreement than the burden-sharing rule implicit in the Kyoto Protocol, a stable global agreement cannot be achieved. A possible strategy to achieve a global agreement without free-riding incentives is a policy mix in which global emission trading is coupled with a transfer mechanism designed to offset ex-post incentives to free ride.
Can Equity Enhance Efficiency?
Lessons from the Kyoto Protocol
Introduction
In the last decades, the importance of international and global environmental problems, such as acid rains, the depletion of the ozone layer and the greenhouse effect, has increased continually. In the absence of a supra-natural authority which enforces environmental policies and regulations, emission reductions can only be achieved via voluntary initiatives and international cooperation. Given the global nature of the above environmental problems, an effective international agreement which implements these emission reductions has to involve as many countries as possible, or at least a number of countries which account for a large share of total emissions. This is particularly true for global warming whose effects and subsequently required mitigation policies are pushed to an unprecedented spatial and time scale.
Unfortunately, broad participation is difficult to achieve (Carraro and Siniscalco, 1993) . Given that emission control is costly and a "clean" atmosphere is a public good, countries hardly have incentive to sign an agreement on emission reductions (the well known free-riding problem). Moreover, structural differences among countries (polluters most often do not suffer the highest damages) imply the difficulty to share the burden of emission reductions in a way that makes it convenient for most countries to sign the agreement (in some countries, abatement costs may not be smaller than the benefits from avoided damages).
These considerations lead to the conclusion that a global agreement on climate change policy is generally unrealistic and that emission reduction policies should focus on two interrelated objectives (IPCC TAR, 2001 , Working Group 3, Chapter 10):
-on the one hand, a cost-effective reduction of emissions; -on the other hand, ways of providing the incentives for countries to sign the agreement.
A recent strand of literature analyses the incentives underlying the emergence of international environmental cooperation and the formation of climate coalitions within the general framework of non-cooperative games. This literature highlights that "self-enforcing agreements", i.e. agreements based on profitable and stable coalitions, may emerge at the equilibrium (Carraro and Siniscalco 1993; Barrett 1994 ). However, in most studies, the size of stable coalitions remains limited for any functional specification of countries' welfare functions (Hoel, 1991; Barrett 1992 Barrett , 1994 Carraro and Siniscalco, 1992; Heal 1994) . Hence, the need to develop strategies which enhance the incentives to sign a climate agreement by making it profitable to most relevant countries and by offsetting their incentives to free-ride.
One of the currently proposed ideas in the debate on climate change policy is that more equitable agreements could be a way of increasing consensus and thus having more signatories of the climate treaty. This idea is at the heart of many of the recommendations contained in the recent 2001 IPCC Summary for Policymakers from Working Group 3. However, albeit intuitive, there is no substantial analysis that more equity would induce more countries to sign and ratify the Kyoto Protocol or another climate agreement. The goal of this paper is exactly to address this issue and to verify the hypothesis that different burden sharing criteria have different impacts on the profitability and stability of a climate agreement. We would also like to assess whether increased equity enhances the likelihood that more countries -and the relevant countries above allaccept to sign and ratify the agreement.
Were this true, we could conclude that equity enhances efficiency, because a larger number of relevant signatories (possibly the big emitters) obviously imply a larger amount of emission abatement.
The fist step of our analysis is a careful examination of the self-enforcing properties of the Kyoto Protocol.
The goal is to apply the above-mentioned game-theoretic framework to assess the profitability and stability of the Kyoto protocol as a function of countries' relative bargaining power. To achieve this goal, we use a revealed preference approach, i.e. we use the actual outcome of the Kyoto Protocol as the evidence that helps identifying countries' bargaining power. Two cases are considered. The first one assumes that the Kyoto agreement is the optimal outcome of the negotiation process, namely that emission reduction limits agreed upon in Kyoto coincide with the welfare maximising ones. In the second one, the Kyoto Protocol is seen as a compromise among countries and the emission reduction limits as the outcome of this compromise. Hence, each country is assumed to set its policy variables in order to maximise its welfare function under the constraints introduced by the Kyoto Protocol.
Given their bargaining power, and the consequent values of emission reduction targets, countries decide whether or not to sign a climate agreement. The analysis of this choice is carried out in this paper for all possible coalition structures and given the payoffs resulting from countries' optimal investment and abatement strategies. This enables us to assess whether the Kyoto Protocol is profitable to all its signatories and stable (no country has an incentive to free ride, i.e. not ratifying and/or implementing the Protocol). Section 2 analyses the profitability and stability of the Kyoto Protocol in two extreme situations. First, when all emission reductions are undertaken domestically without using the so-called Kyoto flexibility mechanisms. Then, when emission reductions can also be undertaken using an emission trading scheme which involves all signatory countries without constraints (no ceilings). It has indeed been argued that the possibility of emission trading, by increasing the cost-effectiveness of the agreement, also increases its stability (i.e. incentives to free-ride are lower and more countries sign. See Eyckmans, 2000a) .
In section 3, we carry out the same type of profitability and stability analysis by modifying countries' bargaining power. In particular, we allow for countries' relative bargaining power to guarantee a more equitable distribution of the burden of abating GHGs emissions. Three burden-sharing criteria, which are different from the one implicit in the emission abatement targets agreed to in Kyoto, are considered. These are: (i) the equalisation of average abatement costs; (ii) the equalisation of per capita abatement costs; and (iii) the equalisation of abatement costs on the GDP ratio. For each of these criteria, the bargaining power that guarantees the ex-post implementation of a given criterion is identified. Then, the profitable and stable coalitions (within all possible coalition structures) are computed in order to verify whether more equity provides incentives for self-enforcing agreements to emerge.
Two profitability criteria and two stability criteria are considered. The definitions of profitability and stability have been derived directly from Carraro and Siniscalco (1993) (see also Eyckmans, 2000a and Yang, 2000 for recent applications to climate policy). We say that an agreement is weakly profitable if the sum of the individual payoffs of the signatories is larger than the sum of their payoffs when no agreement is signed. In this case, the agreement produces a surplus (overall benefits are larger than costs), but this surplus may not profit to all signatories, i.e. some countries may gain, others may lose. By contrast, an agreement is strongly profitable if the payoff of all signatories is larger when the agreement is signed and implemented than when no agreement is signed. Hence, each single participant obtains a net benefit from the agreement.
We say that an agreement is internally stable if there is no incentive to free-ride, i.e. the payoff of each signatory is larger than the payoff he/she would obtain by defecting from the group of signatories (those who remain are supposed to keep cooperating even after the defection). Finally, an agreement is stable if there is no incentive to free ride and no incentive to join the group of signatories, i.e. the payoff to those countries that are not signatories is larger than the one they would achieve by signing the agreement.
Notice that these four criteria are increasingly demanding. Stability implies internal stability which implies strong profitability which implies weak profitability (see Botteon and Carraro, 1997a) . In particular, profitability is a necessary condition for stability. Also notice that a stable agreement is nothing more than a Nash equilibrium agreement Carraro and Moriconi, 1998) . See the Appendix for a formal presentation of the above definitions and results.
Following recent suggestions coming from the theoretical literature (Carraro, 1998) , we do not only consider the possibility that countries agree on a single climate treaty, but we also allow countries to negotiate on different tables and to form different regional agreements (similarly to what happens in trade negotiations).
Therefore, both single and multiple coalition structures will be analysed. In the case of multiple coalitions, the definition of stability is slightly more complex because agreements should also be intra-coalitionally stable (Yi, 1997) . In other words, there should not be incentives to leave one coalition to join a different one.
As a consequence, we will assess profitability and stability of all possible coalition structures that can emerge on the basis of the three equity criteria mentioned above. Therefore, we can evaluate both the incentives to sign a Kyoto-type agreement (i.e. whether Annex 1 countries are willing to sign and ratify a climate agreement when the burden sharing is changed) and the incentives to sign any other climate agreements.
The results achieved in section 3 are not encouraging. Indeed, most coalition structures are neither stable, nor strongly profitable. Hence, in section 4 we develop a further alternative, specifically we will complement the three burden sharing (equity) criteria derived from a specific ex-ante allocation of bargaining powers with ex-post transfer policies designed to offset countries' incentives to free ride. Can these transfer policies help in achieving a global agreement or something close to it? Which equity criterion enhances the effectiveness of these transfer mechanisms?
The surprising answer to these questions will be discussed in the concluding section of this paper, which will also outline directions for further research.
Incentives to sign and ratify the Kyoto Protocol
The goal of this section is twofold. First, the outcome of climate negotiations in Kyoto (the so-called Kyoto Protocol) will be used to identify countries' bargaining power. Then, the properties of the Kyoto Protocol, in particular its profitability and stability, both when all emission reductions are undertaken domestically without using the so-called Kyoto flexibility mechanisms, and when emission reductions can also be undertaken using an unconstrained emission trading scheme which involves all signatory countries, will be analysed.
As said, in order to identify countries' bargaining power, two cases have been considered: -Case 1. The Kyoto Protocol is the welfare maximising outcome of the negotiation process. In other words, the emission reduction limits agreed upon in Kyoto are optimal, i.e. they coincide with those resulting from the maximisation of the sum of the social welfare functions of all countries involved in the negotiations. 1 -Case 2. The Kyoto Protocol is a political compromise and hence sub-optimal from an economic viewpoint. All policy variables are set at their optimal level with the exception of the emission levels which are constrained by the agreement achieved in Kyoto. Therefore, social welfare is not maximised.
In the first case, we thus replicate Kyoto as the result of an unconstrained optimisation procedure, whereas in the second case Kyoto is a constraint imposed to a country's optimisation process.
The analysis is carried out using the original version of the RICE model (Nordhaus and Yang, 1996) . The RICE model is a single sector optimal growth model that has been extended to incorporate the interactions between economic activities and climate. One such model has been developed for each macro region into which the world is divided (USA, Japan, Europe, China, Former Soviet Union, and Rest of the World).
Within each region a central planner chooses the optimal paths of fixed investment and emission abatement that maximise the present value of per capita consumption. Output (net of climate change) is used for investment and consumption and is produced according to a constant returns Cobb-Douglas technology, which combines the inputs from capital and labour with the level of technology. Population (taken to be equal to full employment) and technology levels grow over time in an exogenous fashion, whereas capital accumulation is governed by the optimal rate of investment. There is a wedge between output gross and net of climate change effects, the size of which is dependent upon the amount of abatement (rate of emission reduction) as well as the change in global temperature. The model is completed by three equations representing emissions (which are related to output and abatement), carbon cycle (which relates concentrations to emissions), and climate module (which relates the change in temperature relative to 1990 levels to carbon concentrations) respectively.
Given the RICE representation of the economic system in different world regions and the related impacts on climate, we solved the joint maximisation process through which countries determine the cooperative emission levels and as a consequence the emission reduction targets with respect to the non-cooperative case (our business as usual). In the unconstrained case (Case 1), our attempt was to reproduce the outcome achieved in Kyoto as the difference between cooperative and non cooperative outcomes.
2 This proved to be impossible for all feasible values of countries' bargaining power (the weights in the joint welfare function) unless the structure of the model was changed.
Indeed, given RICE, no sets of weights were able to reproduce the Kyoto Protocol emission targets as the welfare maximising choice of the negotiating countries. Hence, the RICE model had to be modified. The only modification that enabled us to achieve the goal of obtaining the Kyoto targets as a welfare maximising strategy is a change in the parameters of the abatement technology. In particular, it is necessary to assume that abatement costs in the long run are much lower than those embodied in the RICE model, particularly for 2 To identify countries' bargaining power in Kyoto, i.e. the implicit weights in the joint maximisation process which leads to the cooperative outcome, we used an "inverse optimisation approach" (Carraro 1988 (Carraro , 1997 , that is we iteratively computed the weights in the joint welfare function until each region's optimal investment and abatement levels are such to yield the emission targets agreed in Kyoto (see footnote 1). In this way, the solution of the maximisation process can replicate (a) the emission abatement levels for each Annex 1 country and (b) the share of the abatement costs born by Annex 1 and by Non-Annex 1 countries.
the EU, Japan and the US. In words, this is equivalent to say that the Kyoto targets are optimal only if countries believe that technical change will help achieving a sharp reduction of abatement costs in the developed regions of the world. This has a further consequence. The change of the abatement cost functions necessary for Kyoto to be optimal leads to a change in the ranking of marginal abatement costs. In particular, marginal abatement costs in the Rest of the World and China become larger, at least in the long run, than marginal abatement costs in Japan and the EU. These implications are hardly justifiable and in contrast with the results contained in all existing economic models of climate (see Weyant, 1999 for a survey).
This is why we adopted Case 2 as our working hypothesis, in which the Kyoto Protocol is seen as a political compromise which constrains countries' maximisation process. Given this assumption and the original RICE model without changes in the abatement cost functions, the weight of each region in the joint maximisation process -i.e. the burden sharing criterion which is implicit in the decision to accept the Kyoto abatement targets -could be identified as the inverse of its marginal welfare. The weights implicit in the Kyoto agreement are shown in Table 1 . Notice that the largest bargaining power is associated with developed regions, whereas the less developed ones have a lower weight in the joint welfare function.
It is however important to stress that the reference to the Kyoto agreement is partly imprecise. Indeed, instead of assuming that the abatement targets are compulsory only by the end of the so-called first commitment period, we assume that these abatement targets are binding until the end of this century. This is the so-called "Kyoto Forever" hypothesis (Manne and Richels, 1998 Given the above weights, we could move to the second step of our analysis, namely the analysis of the features of the Kyoto agreement. In order to assess the profitability and stability of the Kyoto agreement, we had to compare the payoffs which Annex 1 countries achieve when they cooperate, to the payoffs when no cooperation takes place and/or when a different agreement is signed (this second comparison is crucial in assessing the free-riding incentives and therefore the stability of the Kyoto agreement. See Appendix).
To achieve this goal, we computed the costs and benefits of all possible climate agreements (i.e. coalition structures. See Carraro, 2000) . These costs and benefits can be obtained by solving the game between the six regions of RICE using a numerical iterative algorithm. The equilibrium concept used to solve the game is the usual Nash equilibrium in the non-cooperative case. By contrast, when a coalition forms, it is assumed that countries which sign the agreement maximise their joint welfare and play Nash against the free-riding countries. The resulting equilibrium is equivalent to the γ-equilibrium proposed by Tulkens (1995, 1997) .
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The results of our optimisation experiments, where 203 different coalition structures have been examined, can be summarised as follows:
-The Kyoto forever agreement is neither weakly nor strongly profitable. The reason is that the total surplus provided by the agreement from now to 2100 is slightly negative. Moreover, all regions would lose from signing the agreement (See Table 2 ). This result is not surprising as cooperation may not be beneficial in the presence of free-riders (Carraro and Siniscalco, 1993; Chander and Tulkens, 1997; Carraro and Moriconi, 1998) . 5 When emission trading is allowed for, given the cost-effectiveness properties of unconstrained emission trading, losses are lower (this result confirms the theoretical analysis by Chander et al., 1998) , but the Kyoto agreement still remains neither weakly nor strongly profitable (see Table 2 again). 6 The reason is that the emission levels attained by Non-Annex 1 countries in the long-run are too high. Hence, signatory countries pay the cost of emission abatement without getting any benefits. Notice that, in the presence of trading, the winner would be Japan, whereas the US, the EU and the FSU would keep losing from signing the agreement. The reason is that Japan greatly benefits from emission trading because it is the country with the highest marginal abatement costs. -In addition, the Kyoto forever agreement is neither stable, nor internally stable. Hence, at least one country has an incentive to free ride on the other Annex 1's abatement effort. The US and the FSU have the largest incentive to free ride in the absence of a market for emission permits, followed closely by Japan. Otherwise, the largest incentives to free ride belong to the FSU and the US (see Table 3 ). The only country that gains from emissions trading (Japan) is also the one without any incentives to free ride after the implementation of the trading scheme. -The burden-sharing distribution implicit in the Kyoto agreement and represented by the weights of Table   1 can lead to some weakly profitable agreements (see Table 4 ) even though the Kyoto agreement itself is not weakly profitable as seen above. However, no coalition structure (i.e. no agreement) is either strongly profitable, or stable. The situation improves in the presence of emission trading. Indeed, the share of both weakly and strongly profitable and internally stable coalitions increases when emission trading is allowed. Moreover, one coalition structure (over the 203 possible coalition structures) becomes both internally and externally stable. -The possibility of forming multiple coalitions, rather than negotiating on a single agreement, is of no help. Indeed, no coalition structure with multiple coalitions is stable using the Kyoto burden sharing rule.
The only stable coalition structure, i.e. a Nash equilibrium of the game in which countries decide whether or not to join the coalition under the Kyoto burden-sharing rule, is formed by a coalition of four countries and by two free-riders. However, the four countries are not the Annex 1 countries, but Japan, China, FSU and the Rest of the World. The reason for this result lies in the incentives for cooperation provided by emission trading which favour those countries with the largest differences in marginal abatement costs: in our case, Japan on the one hand, and China, FSU, ROW on the other. The incentive for developing countries to participate in the agreement is further increased by the high damages they would suffer from the impacts of climate changes.
If one believes in the RICE model, the above results cast some doubts on the equity properties of the burdensharing criterion which is implicit in the Kyoto agreement. Indeed, it may be argued that a more equitable distribution of the burden of controlling GHGs emissions would induce all or almost all countries to sign and ratify a climate agreement. The validity of this conjecture will be explored in the next section.
Equity criteria and the structure of equilibrium agreements
In this section, the analysis of the profitability and stability of alternative coalition structures is carried out by using three burden-sharing criteria which are different from the one implicit in the emission abatement targets agreed to in Kyoto. The goal is to check whether more equity induces more countries to sign a climate agreement, thus enhancing efficiency.
The background of the equity debate in mitigating the risks of global climate change can be found in the 1992 U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change. Article 3 states that the Parties have to engage in the protection of the climate system with "common but differentiated responsibilities". This phrase characterises the real beginning of the search for equity proposals, both in the international and intergenerational range.
Since the debate about the adequacy of scope and timing of emission reduction commitments is still ongoing, it becomes more and more obvious that the definition of "fairness" or "equity" in the context of climate change control is not a straightforward task. Different pre-conditions and characteristics of the countries, strong and diverse self-interests, incentives to free ride as well as the special features of climate change, render the approval and acceptance of equity criteria difficult. There exist a number of proposals regarding what could constitute equity in GHGs mitigation. Corresponding to the wide variety of equity principles, a range of possible burden-sharing rules emerged 7 .
Equity proposals usually can be classified by distinguishing whether the applied equity criterion has been chosen according to the initial allocation of emissions ("allocation-based equity criteria"), according to the final outcome of the implementation of the policy instruments ("outcome-based equity criteria") or according to the process by which the criterion has been chosen ("process-based equity criteria").
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Tables 5-7 below summarise the main features of these three different groups of equity proposals and describe the way in which they are usually implemented. Notice that "allocation-based equity criteria" are implemented with reference to the abatement cost function. They are the dominating concepts used and examined in the literature, because they can be easily applied even without specifying the welfare function for each country. Nevertheless, a number of other equity formulations are possible and emerged, mainly related to a redistribution of total welfare. "Winners" should compensate "losers" so that both are better off after mitigation.
Distribute abatement costs so that no nation suffers a net loss of welfare. Implementation criterion: Strong profitability Source: Adapted from Cazorla and Toman (2000) , Tol (2001) , Rose and Stevens (1993) , Rose, Stevens, Edmonds and Wise (1998) and Schmidt and Koschel (1998) . The welfare of the worst-off nation should be maximised, thus maximise the net benefit to the poorest nations.
Distribute largest proportion of net welfare change to poorest nations; majority of emissions reductions (abatement costs) imposed on wealthier nations.
Market justice
The market is "fair", thus make greater use of markets.
Distribute emissions reductions to highest bidder; lowest net abatement costs by using flexible mechanisms (ET).
Consensus
The international negotiation process is fair, thus seek a political solution promoting stability. As said, with a few exceptions, most empirical studies of equity rules focus on "allocation-based equity criteria" (for example, Eyckmans, 2000b, Schmidt and Koschel, 1998) . A notable exception is Tol (2001) , where three equity concepts based on welfare distribution are analysed. The first one relates to Kant with a "Rawlsian touch" ("Do not do to others what you do not want to happen to you", whereby the "others" are the least well-off regions, thus "act as if the impact on the worst-off country is your own"). The second one can be seen as a principle based on Varian's no-envy criterion (for all regions, at all times, the sum of costs of emissions reductions and the costs of climate change should be equal; income distribution should be at the same level where it would have been without climate policy). The third one maximises a global welfare function which explicitly includes an inequality aversion.
The reasons why most empirical studies focus on cost-related equity concepts are their simple implementation and the possibility of comparing the results across studies. Indeed, criteria based on welfare distribution depend on the specification of the welfare function. Existing specifications largely differ across models. In some models, the welfare function is not even defined. By contrast, the specification of abatement costs, and in particular of marginal abatement costs, is subject to much lower variability across models.
For the same reasons, in this paper we also focus on cost-related equity concepts. However, we do not limit our analysis to ex-ante "allocation-based equity criteria" (Egalitarian, Ability-to-pay and Sovereignty), but we rather require that these criteria also hold ex-post. In other words, we compute countries' bargaining power to achieve outcomes of the game characterised by:
• Equal average abatement costs or
• Equal per capita abatement costs or
• Equal abatement costs per unit of GDP in all possible coalition structures. Therefore, the equity criteria adopted in this paper are "outcome based", even though they result from an adequate ex-ante allocation of bargaining powers.
As in the previous section, the first step of the analysis is the identification of the weights in the joint welfare function which reflect a given burden-sharing criterion. Again, an iterative procedure was used, i.e. the cooperative equilibrium of the game was computed for a given set of weights, which were then modified until the equilibrium abatement costs yielded the desired burden-sharing criterion.
Given these weights, for each burden-sharing criterion, all 203 possible coalition structures have been computed and countries' payoffs compared in order to assess the profitability and stability of each coalition structure.
The results of our optimisation experiments are presented in Tables 8, 9 , 10 and 11. They can be summarised as follows: -All three outcome-based criteria increase the probability that a climate agreement yields a surplus.
Indeed the share of weakly profitable coalition structures is much larger with the new three equity criteria than with the burden-sharing rule implicit in the Kyoto agreement (see Table 8 ). Nevertheless, the possibility of regional agreements does not improve the results: no multiple coalition structure is weakly profitable.
-The situation is less positive when the more restrictive criterion of strong profitability is used. Indeed, even the three equity criteria proposed above fail to guarantee a large number of strongly profitable coalition structures. Nonetheless, two of the proposed equity criteria imply that the share of strongly profitable coalition structures is larger than with the burden-sharing rule implicit in the Kyoto agreement (see Table 9 ). When the goal is strong profitability, multiple coalitions again do not provide an incentive structure better than the one provided by single coalitions. -In addition, no coalition structure with multiple coalitions is internally stable (see Table 10 ). Hence, the only coalition structures which could be stable are the ones in which a single coalition forms. However, the share of single coalitions which are both strongly profitable and internally stable further decreases for all burden-sharing criteria (see Table 10 again). Again, only two equity criteria (equal per capita abatement costs and equal abatement costs per unit of GDP) show better results than the burden-sharing rule implicit in the Kyoto agreement. -As a consequence, only very few coalition structures are likely to be stable, i.e. without any incentives to leave or to enter the coalition. As shown by Table 11 , only one coalition is both profitable and stable, namely it emerges as a Nash equilibrium of the game in which countries non-cooperatively decide whether or not to join the coalition. This equilibrium coalition structure is formed by a coalition of three countries and by three free-riders. It can be obtained only if ex-ante all countries agree that abatement efforts must be such to equalise abatement costs per capita. This coalition is formed by Japan, the Former Soviet Union and ROW. Two possible ways of addressing the problem are available. First, policy strategies could be designed to further redistribute the surplus provided by the cooperative behaviour within a coalition. This would increase the number of strongly profitable coalitions and hence the probabilities to identify a stable coalition structure. Transfer schemes designed to make a climate agreement profitable to all countries have been proposed for example by Chander and Tulkens (1997) and applied to climate models by Yang (2000) and by Eyckmans (2000a) . 10 A more detailed analysis of how equity criteria can be used to achieve strong profitability (fairness in their wording) is contained in Gilotte et al. (2001) .
Second, policy strategies could be designed to redistribute the surplus achieved by internally stable coalitions with the goal to induce other countries to enter the coalition. This idea is proposed and analysed in Carraro and Siniscalco (1993) who show that, with symmetric countries, the transfer mechanisms can be used to broaden the coalition only if all countries in the initial, internally stable coalition are committed to cooperation once the transfer scheme is adopted. However, Botteon and Carraro (1997a) provide a counter-example in which asymmetric countries could use the surplus of cooperation achieved by a stable coalition to move to the grand coalition through appropriate transfers and without any form of commitment.
In the next section, we will explore this second possibility. The first one -transfers to increase the number of strongly profitable coalitions -was previously analysed in other papers (above all in Yang, 2000 and Eyckmans and Tulkens, 1999 where a version of the RICE model is also used).
Equity, transfers and global agreements
The conditions for transfers to achieve the goal of expanding a coalition are presented in the Appendix. Here we would like to stress that, at the equilibrium:
-Transfers are self-financed, i.e. countries are allowed to transfer only the surplus yielded by their cooperation. Hence, we analyse how weakly and strongly profitable coalitions can be broadened through a transfer mechanism.
-The transfer mechanism is Pareto optimal, i.e. all countries gain from using transfers to broaden the coalition.
Given this latter restriction, the broadened coalition is also weakly or strongly profitable. However, selffinancing implies that there may not be enough resources to offset the free-riding incentives of all countries which are not in the initial, internally stable coalition. Finally, notice that even countries in the initial stable coalition may have an incentive to free ride when other countries join. Hence, the transfer mechanism must also be such to offset these latter incentives to free ride. Table 12 presents our results. The first column shows the initial, internally stable coalitions for each of the three burden-sharing criteria analysed in the previous section. The second column shows the largest internally stable coalition that can be achieved through a transfer mechanism starting from the corresponding initial, internally stable coalition. Our results can be summarised as follows:
-No transfer mechanism and no ex-ante burden sharing criterion (of the three that we considered) yields an incentive structure or enough resources to achieve the grand coalition, i.e. a global agreement on climate change. At least one region free rides on the agreement.
-The burden-sharing criteria, which are most effective in guaranteeing the achievement of a large coalition without free-riding incentive, are the equalisation of per capita abatement costs and the equalisation of abatement costs per unit of GDP. For example with the former, a coalition formed by Japan, FSU and ROW can offset the free-riding incentives of EU and US. With the latter, a coalition formed by China and US can induce ROW to sign the climate agreement. Notice that the US needs a compensating transfer to enter a coalition which forms according to the criterion of equal per-capita abatement costs, whereas they belong to the initially stable coalitions if the burden-sharing criterion is equal abatement costs per unit of GDP. This is quite intuitive: the US has high per capita emissions, but relatively small emissions per unit of GDP.
Nonetheless, the global agreement cannot be achieved. Hence, we wonder whether the introduction of emission trading, regardless of the ex-ante burden-sharing criterion, can provide enough resources which, once transferred to free-riding countries, can induce them to sign the climate agreement?
The answer to this question is provided by the following proposition: In other words, through emission trading and transfers, all internally stable coalitions can be broadened to achieve the grand coalition.
By using a twofold transfer mechanism, one designed to transform a weakly profitable coalition into a strongly profitable one (i.e. as in Gilotte, 2000) , and a second one designed to make it internally stable, we achieve an even stronger conclusion:
Proposition 2: The result of Proposition 1 holds for all initial weakly profitable coalitions.
The list of all weakly and strongly profitable coalitions is provided in Table 13 . Starting from any of these coalition structures, and applying an unconstrained trading scheme jointly with appropriate transfer mechanisms, it is possible to achieve the grand coalition.
There is a main weakness in the above conclusions, which depends on the specification of the RICE model.
Most resources to fund the transfer mechanism which helps in achieving the grand coalition do not come from the US or the EU, but from Japan, China and Rest of the World. The example shown in Table 14 can help us to show why. Step 1 analyses the profitability and stability of the coalition formed by EU and ROW using the definitions provided in the Appendix. It is easy to see that the coalition is both strongly profitable and internally stable.
However, it is not externally stable. Japan, China and FSU would like to join. If the three countries enter the coalition, one of the previous participating countries would like to exit the coalition. Hence, transfers can be used to stabilise the coalition formed by Japan, EU, China, FSU and ROW (Step 2). Further transfers are necessary to induce the US to enter the coalition (Step 3). This is certainly feasible, because the benefit achieved by ROW in the grand coalition is large and can easily be used to compensate the free-riding incentive of EU and US (0.227 and 0.113 respectively). However, what is odd is that the EU and the US should receive transfers rather than transferring resources. Of course, we could design a transfer mechanism where resources flow from developed to developing countries. However, we would like to stress that, given the structure of RICE, most gains from a climate agreement go to FSU, China and ROW, which implies that these countries have more resources to induce the other ones to participate in the global agreement.
The realism of this result is obviously open to debate. However, we do not believe that this result undermines the general conclusions achieved above; it simply calls for additional analyses of the incentive structure of climate agreements undertaken using models different from RICE.
Conclusions
The previous sections have analysed the incentive structure of different types of climate agreements using the RICE model as the device of representing the interactions between economic and climate variables. First, we focused on the Kyoto Protocol. After having identified the burden-sharing rule implicit in the Kyoto Protocol, we analysed the profitability of the protocol and its stability, namely the eventual incentives to free ride on the protocol. The conclusion is that almost all Annex 1 countries lose by signing the agreement and that more than one of these countries have an incentive to free-ride, i.e. the net benefit from letting the other countries to reduce emissions is larger than the net benefit from reducing emissions. Of course, net benefits take into account the avoided damages from climate change at least as far as they are represented in RICE (in a very simplistic manner indeed).
Second, we analysed the conjecture that a more equitable ex-post distribution of the burden of reducing emissions could provide the right incentives for more countries -particularly big emitters -to accept an emission reduction scheme defined within an international climate agreement. Our optimisation experiments only partly support this conjecture. Even though more equitable burden sharing rules provide better incentives to sign and ratify a climate agreement than the burden-sharing rule implicit in the Kyoto Protocol, a stable agreement cannot generally be achieved, i.e. equity seems to enhance the profitability of climate agreements but it does not offset the incentives to free-ride.
Third, we verify whether there exists a transfer mechanism that could help broadening an initially stable, but partial, coalition achieved by agreeing on an equitable burden-sharing scheme. Our results suggest that transfers can indeed help broadening a given coalition. However, the grand coalition could not be achieved at least with the three equity rules considered in this paper (equal average abatement costs, equal per capita abatement costs and equal abatement costs per unit of GDP).
The only strategy which we showed could achieve a global agreement without free-riding incentives is a policy mix in which global emission trading is coupled with a transfer mechanism designed to offset ex-post incentives to free ride. This policy mix can achieve a stable global agreement whatever the initially stable coalition and whatever the ex-ante burden-sharing rule.
As a consequence, our results seem to suggest that an excessive focus on equity rules is not fruitful. It is more effective to minimise overall abatement costs via emission trading and then use the resulting surplus to provide incentives for free-riding countries to join the initial coalition.
The above results are obviously very preliminary. Firstly, we compared only four burden-sharing criteriathe one implicit in the Kyoto agreement and three additional ones. Other criteria could obviously produce different results, even though the equity rules applied in this paper encompass most of the empirical rules likely to be proposed.
Secondly, and most importantly, all results crucially depend on the specification of the RICE model and on its way off assessing costs and benefits of emission abatement. It is well-known that the RICE model is a very useful but simplified representation of the economic system and that its environmental components are very limited. Therefore, it would be important to check whether our results are robust with respect to different model specifications. In particular, results are sensitive to the specification of the damage function and to the long-run dynamics of the model. A lower damage from climate change perceived in developing countries would reduce the benefits of GHGs emission control policies in these countries and therefore their incentives to join a coalition and to contribute to transfer schemes. The analysis of the links between equity and efficiency using other climate models is next in our research agenda.
Nonetheless, we believe that these caveats do not weaken the interest of our results for climate policy, even though the specific numerical findings need further testing and sensitivity analysis.
APPENDIX
A game-theoretic framework to analyse international climate agreements.
Consider n countries (n≥2) that interact in a common environment and bargain over emission control of a specific pollutant. Let W i (x 1 ... x n ) be a country's welfare function, where x i , i=1,2,...,n, denotes a vector containing country i's emissions and all other economic variables affecting abatement costs and the environmental damage perceived in each country. The function W i (.), i=1,2,...,n, captures countries' interaction in a global environment, as welfare depends on all countries' emissions as well as on other transnational variables (i.e. trade policy variables). Let P i (s) denote the value of country i's welfare when it decides to join the coalition s, whereas Q i (s) is the value of its welfare when country i does not join the coalition s. Let us assume that only one coalition can be formed. Conditions which hold when multiple coalitions form can be found in Yi (1997) , Carraro and Moriconi (1998) .
As the focus of this section is to analyse the formation of coalition, the only argument of the value of the welfare function is the identity and number of cooperating countries. However, it is implicit that all other relevant variables in RICE, including emissions and policy decisions in other countries, enter country i's welfare function. Hence P i (∅), i=1,2,...,n, is a country's non-cooperative payoff (the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium payoff), whereas P i (S) is country i's payoff when all countries decide to cooperate (the grandcoalition S is formed).
Notice that when a country joins the environmental coalition, it determines its optimal emission level by maximising a function reflecting the agreed-upon burden sharing rule (i.e. in the case of the Nash-bargaining rule, emissions are determined by maximising the product of the deviation of cooperative countries' emissions from the non cooperative level). When a country does not join the coalition, it sets emissions by maximising its own welfare function given the emissions levels of all other countries (emissions are therefore defined by its own best-reply function). This behavioural assumption defines the concept of γ-equilibrium (Chander and Tulkens, 1997) .
Two conditions must be met for an environmental coalition to be self-enforcing (see Carraro and Siniscalco, 1993; Barrett, 1994) . First, the coalition must be profitable, i.e. each country i∈s gains from joining the coalition, with respect to its position when no countries cooperate.
Formally, a coalition s is profitable if:
The answer provided by the literature and by the practice of international agreements focuses on transfers as means to bribe non signatory countries. Notice that we are not referring to the possibility of using transfers or side-payments to make the agreement profitable to all countries. This latter issue is discussed in Chander and Tulkens (1997) , Eyckmans (2000) , Yang (2000) . Here we start from the necessary condition that the agreement is profitable, and we look at the possibility that transfers increase the stability of the agreement.
In this context, which is discussed in detail in Carraro and Siniscalco (1993) , a non-trivial analysis of transfers requires to impose constraints on the amount of resources to be transferred: were the transfers unconstrained, all non-signatories could be bribed, but the mechanism would not be credible. Therefore, we assume that: (i) transfers must be self-financed, i.e. the total transfer T must be lower than the gain that the committed countries obtain from expanding the coalition; (ii) the move to a larger coalition must be Paretoimproving, i.e. all countries must increase their welfare vis-à-vis the situation preceding the coalition expansion, and vis-à-vis non-cooperation (the larger coalition must also be profitable).
Under these conditions, however, the theoretical literature has provided a negative result. If countries are symmetric, self-financed transfers cannot induce free-riders to sign the environmental agreement, unless some degrees of commitment constrain the strategic choices of cooperating countries. 13 However, in the case of asymmetric countries, transfers can be used to expand the initially stable coalition even in the absence of any forms of commitment (Botteon and Carraro, 1997a ).
Let us start by analysing which conditions have to be satisfied in order to induce an additional country to enter a stable coalition. Suppose the coalition s is stable. If its members are committed to cooperation, their joint additional benefit when country j enters the coalition is:
(4) Σ i∈s [P i (s∪j) -P i (s)] > 0
The incentive for country j to free ride from the s∪j coalition is:
(5) Q j (s) -P j (s∪j) > 0 because the coalition s∪j is not stable. Hence, the coalition s∪j can be stabilised by a system of transfers if:
(6) Σ i∈s [P i (s∪j) -P i (s)] > Q j (s) -P j (s∪j) and:
(i) there exists a sharing rule such that P i (s∪j) -P i (s) > 0 for all i∈s.
(ii) countries belonging to the coalition s are committed to cooperation.
If this latter condition is not satisfied, in the symmetric case transfers cannot expand a stable coalition (Carraro and Siniscalco, 1993) . However, in the asymmetric case, transfers may succeed in expanding the stable coalitions s even without any forms of commitment. In the asymmetric case, all countries may have a cost of belonging to the coalition much lower than the cost of exiting it. 14 Formally, Q i (s∪j\i) -P i (s∪j) may be negative for all i∈s. If this is the case, the coalition s∪j can be stabilised by a system of transfers if:
(7) Σ i∈s [P i (s∪j) -Q i (s∪j\i)] > Q j (s) -P j (s∪j)
Notice that this latter condition is more restrictive than condition (6) because: P i (s) < Q i (s∪j\i), i∈s.
